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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Indigenous movements have become increasingly powerful 
in the last couple of decades and they are now important 
political actors in some South American countries, such as 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and, to a lesser extent, Peru and Chile. The 
rise of indigenous movements has provoked concern among 
U.S. policymakers and other observers who have feared that 
these movements will exacerbate ethnic polarization, 
undermine democracy, and jeopardize U.S. interests in the 
region. This paper argues that concern over the rise of 
indigenous movements is greatly exaggerated. It maintains 
that the rise of indigenous movements has not brought about 
a marked increase in ethnic polarization in the region 
because most indigenous organizations have been ethnically 
inclusive and have eschewed violence. Although the 
indigenous movements have at times demonstrated a lack of 
regard for democratic institutions and procedures, they have 
also helped deepen democracy in the Andean region by 
promoting greater political inclusion and participation and by 
aggressively combating ethnic discrimination and inequality. 
Finally, this study suggests that the indigenous population 
has opposed some U.S.-sponsored initiatives, such as coca 
eradication and market reform, for legitimate reasons.  Such 
policies have had some negative environmental, cultural, and 
economic consequences for indigenous people, which U.S. 
policymakers should try to address. The conclusion provides 
some specific policy recommendations on how to go about 
this.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S POLICYMAKERS 
 
The U.S. should try to engage indigenous movements in 
Latin America, rather than marginalize them. It should 
dialogue more frequently with the current generation of 
indigenous leaders and it should seek to educate and build 
ties to the next generation. The U.S. should also identify 
common areas of interest and work with indigenous 
movements to advance them. For example, the U.S. should 
support the indigenous movement‟s efforts to address 
inequality and discrimination and to promote indigenous 
political participation and representation.  At the same time, 
however, the United States needs to continue to take a stand 
against policies or actions by indigenous leaders that 
undermine democracy.  
 
Policymakers should also take steps to ensure that U.S.-
sponsored free market policies help, rather than hurt, the 
indigenous population. The United States should help create 
social programs designed to compensate for cuts in social 
spending and enable the indigenous population to compete 
more effectively in the market economy. Such programs 
could provide training and credit to indigenous farmers and 
entrepreneurs as well as seek to improve local health and 
education systems.  The U.S. should also ensure that U.S. 
mining, forestry, and agricultural companies clean up the 
environmental damage caused by their activities and 
minimize such damage in the future.  
 
In addition, the U.S. should reorient its counternarcotics 
policy in several ways. First, the U.S. should acknowledge 
that there are legitimate, traditional uses of coca and it 
should work with Andean governments to limit coca farming 
to the amounts necessary to supply those traditional uses. 
Second, the U.S. should shift its focus away from coca 
eradication and devote more resources to encouraging 
indigenous farmers to grow alternative crops. Finally, the 
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U.S. needs to do more to reduce the market for illegal drugs, 
such as cocaine, in the United States. 
 
INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS, DEMOCRACY, AND U.S. 
INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Indigenous movements are increasingly important political 
actors in South America. From Colombia to Chile, 
indigenous organizations have emerged in recent years to 
contest elections, carry out protests, and make policy 
demands. Some observers have argued that these indigenous 
movements represent a real threat to U.S. interests in the 
region. They point out that indigenous organizations have 
opposed various U.S.-sponsored initiatives in Latin America 
from free-market policies to coca eradication. Moreover, 
according to many of these skeptics, indigenous movements 
will exacerbate ethnic polarization and undermine 
democracy in the region. 
  
This paper argues that concern over the rise of indigenous 
movements is greatly exaggerated. It suggests that the 
indigenous population has valid reasons to oppose some 
U.S.-sponsored initiatives, such as coca eradication and 
market reform. Indigenous movements have resisted market-
oriented policies in large part because such policies have 
failed to bring significant benefits to indigenous areas and at 
times have had negative environmental and economic 
consequences. They have opposed coca eradication, 
meanwhile, because coca is a traditional part of indigenous 
culture and coca growing has provided a livelihood for many 
indigenous peasants. As I discuss in the Conclusion, there 
are a number of steps U.S. policymakers could and should 
take to address these concerns. 
 
This paper also argues that the rise of indigenous movements 
has not brought about a marked increase in ethnic 
polarization in the region because most indigenous 
organizations have been ethnically inclusive and have 
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eschewed violence. The rise of indigenous movements has 
had some negative consequences on democracy, however. 
Indigenous leaders and movements sometimes have 
demonstrated a lack of regard for institutions of liberal 
democracy and they have participated in protests that have 
led to the removal of democratically elected presidents in 
Bolivia and Ecuador.  Yet at the same time, the indigenous 
movements have helped deepen democracy in the Andean 
region by promoting greater political inclusion and 
participation and by aggressively combating ethnic 
discrimination and inequality. Thus, the overall effect of the 
rise of indigenous movements on democracy is mixed. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. The first section 
discusses the rise of indigenous movements in the region, 
focusing on Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. The second 
section explores why indigenous organizations have opposed 
U.S.-sponsored coca eradication and market-oriented 
policies in the region. The third section examines what 
impact these movements have had on democracy and ethnic 
polarization in the region. The conclusion offers some 
recommendations as to how U.S. policymakers should deal 
with the indigenous movements. 
 
THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS  
 
Indigenous people represent a significant portion of the 
population in Latin America. According to recent census 
data on ethnic self-identification, indigenous people 
represent 62 percent of the population in Bolivia, 42 percent 
in Guatemala, 27 percent of the population in Peru, 6 percent 
of the population in Ecuador and 4 percent in Chile (Layton 
and Patrinos 2006). Nevertheless, the indigenous population 
traditionally played little role in politics in the region. Not 
only did the indigenous population typically lack its own 
parties, but it had little representation in the main parties and 
political institutions in the region. 
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In the last two decades, that has begun to change. Powerful 
indigenous movements and parties have emerged in some 
countries in the region and indigenous people have gained 
increasing representation in these countries‟ main political 
institutions (Lucero 2008; Madrid 2008; Van Cott 2005; 
Yashar 2005).  The indigenous movement is currently 
strongest in Bolivia where indigenous people currently have 
a significant presence at all levels of government, but 
Ecuador and, to a lesser extent, Chile and Peru, also have 
active indigenous movements. 
 
Bolivia has had important indigenous organizations since the 
1970s when an independent political movement known as 
the Kataristas emerged among the Aymara population. 
During the late 1970s, the Katarista movement founded a 
national indigenous confederation, the Confederación 
Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(CSUTCB), and carried out protests that helped pave the 
way for the return to democracy in the country. After the 
return to democracy, coca grower unions that were 
composed mostly of Quechua-speaking peasants gradually 
took over the CSUTCB. Under their leadership, the 
CSUTCB became increasingly militant, carrying out a wave 
of protests and marches. In 1995, at the instigation of the 
coca growers, the CSUTCB, along with a confederation of 
peasant colonists, the Confederación Sindical de 
Colonizadores de Bolivia (CSCB), and a women‟s peasant 
federation, Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas 
Indígenas Bartolina Sisa, founded an indigenous party, the 
Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP). The ASP 
did not initially fare well in elections outside of its base in 
the coca growing areas of rural Cochabamba, and in 1998 it 
split up because of divisions among its leadership. One of its 
leaders, Evo Morales, then founded a new party, the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), by borrowing the 
registration of a largely defunct left-wing party. Under 
Morales‟ leadership, the MAS expanded its base, reaching 
out to indigenous and mestizo leaders and organizations 
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throughout the country. Morales and the MAS finished a 
surprising second in the 2002 elections and then captured the 
presidency in 2005. Morales was reelected in 2009 by a large 
margin. 
 
The ascent of Morales and the MAS has increased the 
political influence of the indigenous movement in Bolivia 
considerably. Numerous indigenous leaders have been 
elected to local and national level offices, while others have 
been appointed to important governmental posts. Morales 
and the other leaders of the MAS also consult regularly with 
indigenous leaders and organizations through party 
assemblies and congresses as well as through a governmental 
advisory body known as the National Coordinator for 
Change (CONALCAM). Most indigenous organizations in 
Bolivia have supported the government and have reaped 
benefits from doing so. However, some indigenous leaders 
and organizations, such as the Amazonian indigenous 
confederation, the Confederación Indígena del Oriente y 
Amazonia Boliviano (CIDOB), and an association of 
traditional highlands governing bodies, the Consejo Nacional 
de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), have had 
fallings out with the government or have opted to maintain 
their independence from it. 
 
Ecuador also has a relatively strong indigenous movement. 
The largest indigenous confederation in Ecuador, the 
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
(CONAIE), first emerged in the late 1980s and carried out a 
number of highly successful protests during the 1990s. In the 
mid-1990s, CONAIE helped found an indigenous-based 
political party, Pachakutik, which won a significant number 
of mayoral and legislative positions in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, and helped elect Lucio Gutiérrez president in 
2002. In the last five years, however, the influence of 
CONAIE and Pachakutik has been on the wane. Pachakutik 
fared rather poorly in elections in 2006 and 2009, and 
CONAIE has had less success in mobilizing people in 
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protests. Moreover, both CONAIE and Pachakutik have had 
a frosty relationship with the current Ecuadorian president, 
Rafael Correa. Some other indigenous organizations, 
meanwhile, have sought to challenge CONAIE‟s 
preeminence in the indigenous movement, including an 
evangelical indigenous federation, the Federación 
Ecuatoriana de Iglesias Evangélicas (FEINE), and the 
Federación Nacional de Organizations Campesinas, 
Indígenas, y Negras (FENOCIN), a leftist federation of 
indigenous and black organizations. Neither of these 
organizations commands the support of nearly as many 
indigenous people and communities as CONAIE, but they 
have had more influence with recent governments.  
 
The indigenous movement in Peru is considerably weaker 
than the Bolivian and Ecuadorian movements. There are 
some strong organizations in the Peruvian Amazonian, 
notably the Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva 
Peruana (AIDESEP), and the Confederación de 
Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú (CONAP), but the vast 
majority of the Peruvian indigenous population lives in the 
highlands where indigenous organizations are weak and 
fragmented. The two traditional organizations of highlands 
peasants, the Confederación Campesina del Peru (CCP) and 
the Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA) were both 
severely weakened by the guerrilla war that ravaged the 
highlands in the 1980s and early 1990s. The Shining Path 
targeted many peasant organizers for assassination and the 
violence made it difficult for organizations in the highlands 
to engage in political activity. Neither of these organizations 
has recovered since that time. They have relatively few 
members and their main affiliates are based far from the 
country‟s capital and main center of power. The most 
influential indigenous organization in the highlands in recent 
years has been an organization that sprang up to protest the 
negative environmental effects of mining in largely 
indigenous communities, the Confederación Nacional de 
Comunidades del Perú Afectados por la Minería 
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(CONACAMI). Nevertheless, even this organization has 
limited ability to mobilize people or shape national policies. 
 
Chile has the weakest indigenous movement of the four 
countries, but one that has become increasingly active in 
recent years. Chile‟s indigenous movement is concentrated 
in the southern part of the country where the Mapuche 
population lives. The movement is relatively fragmented, 
however, and no single organization commands the 
allegiance of most Mapuche people. One of the most militant 
organizations is the Consejo de Todas las Tierras, an 
organization formed in 1991, which has carried out 
numerous protests and occupations to demand land rights 
and political autonomy for the Mapuche in Chile. 
Nevertheless, the Consejo de Todas las Tierras has not 
demonstrated an ability to mobilize large numbers of people 
and it has alienated the main political parties and actors in 
Chile. Other organizations have close ties to the main 
political parties, but these organizations have yet to 
demonstrate that they have appreciable support within the 
Mapuche population. 
 
U.S. INITIATIVES IN THE REGION 
 
Indigenous movements in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru 
have vigorously opposed some U.S. policy initiatives in the 
region, including free market reform. Over the last several 
decades, Latin American countries have implemented a 
variety of free market reforms, privatizing numerous state-
owned companies and opening up their economies to foreign 
trade and investment. Chile, which initiated its reforms in the 
mid-1970s, has gone the furthest in terms of implementing 
these policies, but Bolivia, Peru, and, to a lesser extent, 
Ecuador also enacted important measures beginning in the 
late 1980s or early 1990s. The U.S. has strongly encouraged 
Latin American countries to enact these policies, providing 
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aid, debt refinancing, and other benefits to countries that 
implement the free market reforms. 
 
The reforms have brought a number of benefits. They have 
helped Latin American countries conquer hyperinflation, 
they have generated increased financial flows to the region, 
and they have given Latin American consumers access to a 
broad range of, often inexpensive, foreign made products. 
The reforms have generated uneven growth over time and 
within countries, however, and the policies have actually had 
a negative impact on many indigenous communities. 
Indigenous peasant farmers have had a hard time competing 
with the agricultural imports that flooded Latin American 
markets when their governments reduced tariff barriers. 
Indigenous people have also been hard hit by cuts in 
government social spending that have accompanied the 
neoliberal reforms. The removal of restrictions on foreign 
investment, meanwhile, has led many foreign companies to 
establish mining, oil exploration, forestry, and agricultural 
concerns on traditionally indigenous lands. Indigenous 
people have complained that these companies have often 
caused environmental damage and brought few benefits to 
the indigenous communities located in these areas. 
 
As the 1990s wore on, indigenous people mounted an 
increasing number of protests against the neoliberal policies 
and their effects. In Ecuador, for example, the indigenous 
movement first came to prominence in the 1990s because of 
the massive marches, roadblocks, and demonstrations they 
carried out to protest market-oriented policies implemented 
by the Rodrigo Borja, Sixto Durán Ballén, and Abdalá 
Bucaram administrations in Ecuador. During this period, the 
Ecuadorian indigenous movement came to be known as the 
leading opponent of neoliberal policies in the country (Ibarra 
2002, 28). In Bolivia as well, the indigenous movement 
spearheaded the opposition to free market policies beginning 
in the 1990s. The Bolivian indigenous movement was 
particularly critical of trade liberalization, the privatization 
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of natural resource companies, and a proposal to export 
natural gas through Chile. In Peru and Chile, the indigenous 
movement has not played a central role in the struggle 
against free market policies, but they have carried out 
protests against them. Moreover, in both countries, the 
indigenous movement has aggressively opposed policies that 
have opened up indigenous areas for mining and forestry 
activities by multinational companies. 
 
Indigenous movements in Bolivia and Peru have also 
vigorously opposed U.S-sponsored coca eradication efforts. 
The U.S. has been extensively involved in coca eradication 
programs in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru where much of the 
world‟s supply of coca is grown. These programs have met 
particularly strong resistance in Bolivia where the unions of 
coca growers are quite powerful and wield a great deal of 
authority within the indigenous movement. Indigenous 
organizations in Peru have also opposed coca eradication, 
but the coca growers in Peru have less influence in the 
Peruvian indigenous movement. As a result, the Peruvian 
indigenous movement has not made an end to coca 
eradication one of its principal demands. 
 
Coca growers in both countries have held numerous protests 
and marches in efforts to block eradication efforts. In Peru, 
for example, the coca growers held a 16 day march in 2003 
that involved more than 8,000 participants (Cabieses 2004, 
11). President Toledo eventually met with the marchers after 
they arrived in Lima and agreed to some of their demands, 
declaring that “all of you, producers of coca—you are not 
narcotraffickers” (Cabieses 2004, 12).  The coca grower 
unions have also sought to gain influence through the 
electoral process. Leaders of the coca growers have won 
numerous mayoralties in coca growing regions in the 
Department of Ayacucho and they also elected 
representatives to the national legislature and the Andean 
Parliament in 2006 (Huber 2008). 
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Coca growers have gained even more influence in Bolivia. In 
Bolivia, coca growing expanded dramatically beginning in 
the 1980s when many Quechua-speaking Bolivians migrated 
to the sub-tropical areas of Cochabamba in search of work. 
The coca growers formed strong unions, which used 
roadblocks, marches, and other protests to resist U.S.-
sponsored coca eradication policies. As we have seen, these 
coca grower unions helped create an indigenous-based 
political party, and eventually managed to get their leader, 
Evo Morales, elected as president of Bolivia. After taking 
office, Morales expanded the amount of coca that Bolivians 
were allowed to grow legally in the country. Under Morales, 
the Bolivian government has continued to eradicate coca 
grown outside of the legally protected areas and narcotics 
seizures have actually increased in recent years. 
Nevertheless, the U.S has repeatedly accused Morales of 
failing to do enough to fight narco-trafficking and in late 
2008 it suspended trade preferences it had granted Bolivia 
under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication 
Act (ATPDEA). Morales retaliated by expelling the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Agency from the country. 
 
Indigenous movements in the Andes have opposed coca 
eradication in part because coca is a traditional part of 
indigenous culture in the region. Coca leaf, which is a mild 
stimulant, has been chewed by indigenous inhabitants of the 
Andes for thousands of years (Lloréns 2004). It is also used 
to prepare coca leaf tea, or mate de coca, and it is employed 
in various traditional medicines. In Peru, a 2003 survey 
found that approximately three million Peruvians, or fifteen 
percent of the population, chew coca leaf, and another 
million Peruvians also use the coca leaf to prepare coca leaf 
tea (Rospigliosi 2004, 13-4). Indigenous people constitute 
about three-quarters of the people who chew coca leaves in 
Peru, but coca leaf tea is consumed by all sectors of society 
in Peru (Rospigliosi 2004, 39). The percentage of coca leaf 
chewers among the total population is probably even greater 
in Bolivia, although precise figures were not available. In 
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both Bolivia and Peru, however, the amount of coca grown 
significantly exceeds the quantity consumed in traditional 
ways and this surplus makes its way into the hands of narco-
traffickers. 
 
The indigenous movement has also opposed coca eradication 
programs because of the negative health and environmental 
consequences of aerial spraying of coca crops and the 
violence that has been associated with some coca eradication 
efforts. Nevertheless, the main reason that indigenous 
movements have opposed coca eradication is because coca 
growing is an important source of income for many 
indigenous people. In Peru, some 50,000 people were 
estimated to work in the coca industry in 2004, and the 
number has certainly grown since that time because the 
number of hectares of coca under cultivation has steadily 
increased in recent years (Cabieses 2004, 12; McClintock 
and Vallas 2010, 207). The number of coca growers in 
Bolivia is also quite large. By the early 1990s, there were 
more than 40,000 coca growers in Cochabamba alone and 
the number has continued to expand since that time, both in 
Cochabamba and in other departments, such as La Paz 
(Healy 1991, 88-9). Although most coca growers in Bolivia 
and Peru are not wealthy by any standard, they earn 
considerably more from coca growing than they could from 
other available forms of employment. 
 
The indigenous movement thus has valid reasons to be 
concerned about both coca eradication and free market 
reform. Both policies have had some negative economic, 
environmental, and health consequences for indigenous 
people and they have undermined traditional indigenous 
customs. The indigenous movement has viewed these 
policies as being imposed on their countries by the United 
States and other foreign interests, which has exacerbated 
anti-American attitudes among the movement‟s leaders. It is 
therefore in the interest of the United States to address these 
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concerns, and the conclusion provides some 
recommendations about how the U.S. might do this. 
 
IMPACT ON ETHNIC POLARIZATION & DEMOCRACY 
 
Some observers have expected the rise of indigenous 
movements to have a very negative impact on ethnic 
polarization and democracy in Latin America. National 
security analysts in Washington have argued that indigenous 
movements promote radicalism and ethnic separatism ("A 
political awakening” 2004, 37; Madrid 2005; Oppenheimer 
2003, 16A).  Many Latin Americans have also been 
concerned. In Chile, for example, prominent politicians have 
accused the Mapuche movement of promoting separatism 
and disrespect for the rule of law (Haughney 2006, 72).  
 
In addition, an extensive scholarly literature has linked the 
rise of ethnic movements and parties to ethnic conflict and 
the breakdown of democracy.  According to this literature, 
ethnic parties often engage in outbidding—that is, they seek 
to woo support among members of their own ethnic group by 
demonizing members of other ethnic groups and demanding 
policies that favor members of their own ethnic group 
(Horowitz 1985; Reilly 2001; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; 
Sisk 1996). This worsens ethnic tensions and often leads to 
conflict. Reilly (2001, 9) warns that the consequences of 
ethnic outbidding “can be devastating: moderate forces are 
quickly overwhelmed by more extreme voices, leading to an 
ongoing cycle of violence and retribution.” Rabushka and 
Shepsle  (1972, 85), meanwhile, suggest that “as ethnicity 
becomes increasingly salient, every political decision favors 
one community and hinders others.”  Ethnic groups that are 
out of power may use violence to try to achieve their aims or 
improve their bargaining position, whereas ethnic groups 
that are in power may employ force to repress them. 
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Much of this literature, however, assumes that the 
boundaries between ethnic groups are relatively clear and 
stable and that individuals will only support the parties and 
movements that are created to represent their group (Chandra 
2001, 2005). As a result, ethnic parties and movements have 
incentives to use exclusionary appeals to court members of 
their own ethnic group, rather than reaching out to members 
of other ethnic groups through inclusive appeals. In Latin 
America, however, mestizaje or racial mixing has blurred the 
boundaries between members of different ethnic groups and 
reduced ethnic polarization. In surveys many people identify 
with more than one ethnic group or express fluid, mixed, or 
ambivalent ethnic loyalties. For example, many people who 
self-identify as mestizo on some surveys identify with some 
indigenous category on others.  These mestizos often appear 
indigenous, maintain traditional indigenous customs, and 
sympathize with some traditional demands of the indigenous 
movement. Moreover, even many whites sympathize with 
some indigenous demands. Indigenous movements in Latin 
America thus have incentives to avoid exclusionary behavior 
and to woo the support of whites and mestizos.  
 
In fact, indigenous movements in Latin America have 
reached out to members of other ethnic groups. They have 
largely eschewed exclusionary rhetoric and actions, they 
have formed numerous alliances with non-indigenous groups 
and leaders, and they have embraced a variety of non-ethnic 
causes and demands. The indigenous movement in Ecuador, 
for example, came together with various non-indigenous 
organizations and leaders to create Pachakutik in the mid-
1990s. Pachakutik has developed a broad and inclusive 
platform, it has recruited many whites and mestizos as 
candidates, and it has forged alliances with non-indigenous 
parties and endorsed non-indigenous presidential candidates. 
The Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia has been similarly 
ethnically inclusive. Indeed, Bolivia‟s vice president and 
approximately half of the MAS‟s legislators are non-
indigenous and the MAS has maintained numerous alliances 
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with white and mestizo-dominated parties and organizations. 
The leaders of these parties have preached ethnic tolerance 
and emphasized that they do not represent indigenous people 
alone. 
 
As a result, the rise of indigenous movements in the Andes 
has not led to a dramatic increase in ethnic polarization in the 
region. Inter-ethnic relations in the region continue to be 
friendly for the most part, although discrimination against 
indigenous people and Afro-Latinos is commonplace. There 
has been a notable increase in polarization in Bolivia during 
the Morales administration, but the polarization is more 
political than ethnic in nature. Moreover, ethnically-related 
violence in the region is still quite rare. Indigenous groups 
have organized numerous illegal protests, including 
roadblocks and the occupation of land and buildings. In 
Chile, indigenous groups have even been accused of setting 
fire to buildings and lands. As a result, there have been 
numerous confrontations between indigenous protesters and 
the police or military in the Andean nations. Some of these 
have turned violent, such as a 2008 confrontation in the 
Peruvian Amazon. There have been few incidents of inter-
communal violence, however, and indigenous leaders have 
typically foresworn the use of arms. Some guerrilla 
movements, such as the Shining Path in Peru, have recruited 
numerous indigenous foot soldiers, but these have been not 
been indigenous-led movements, and they typically have not 
embraced ethnic demands. The few indigenous-led armed 
movements that have emerged in the region, such as the 
Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katari in Bolivia, have not 
obtained a significant following among indigenous people 
and have disappeared. 
 
The indigenous movements have undermined democracy in 
other ways, however. Indigenous organizations have 
participated in various protests that have brought about the 
overthrow of elected leaders. CONAIE, for example, 
spearheaded non-violent protests in Ecuador that led to the 
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removal of President Abdalá Bucaram in 1996 and Jamil 
Mahuad in 2000. In the latter case, the indigenous 
movement‟s occupation of government buildings caused 
Mahuad to flee the presidential palace and led to the creation 
of a ruling triumvirate that included the head of CONAIE, 
Antonio Vargas, as a well as a member of the Supreme Court 
and the military. This triumvirate lasted only a short time, 
however, before the military insisted on handing power over 
to the country‟s vice president. Indigenous protests also led 
Bolivian presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Carlos 
Mesa to step down. Sánchez de Lozada resigned under 
pressure in 2003 after his efforts to repress the protests led to 
the deaths of more than 60 protestors.  His vice president, 
Carlos Mesa, then took over as president, but Mesa only 
governed for a year and a half before he too had to step down 
in the face of indigenous protests. 
 
Indigenous movements have also weakened democracy in 
Bolivia through their participation in the Morales 
administration. The government of Morales has undermined 
horizontal accountability through various measures, 
including packing the judiciary and other traditionally non-
partisan institutions with his supporters. It has also reformed 
the constitution to expand the powers of the president and 
permit Morales to run for a second term. In addition, the 
Morales administration has undermined the rule of law by 
using mass mobilizations to intimidate the opposition. 
Supporters of Morales, for example, carried out protests to 
put pressure on the opposition to pass the constitutional 
reform and the agrarian reform law as well as to intimidate 
opposition prefects into resigning. The Morales 
administration has also filed criminal charges against leading 
members of the opposition, including former presidents, 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Carlos Mesa, Eduardo 
Rodríguez Veltze, and Jorge Quiroga, as well as current or 
former opposition governors, Manfred Reyes Villa, Leonel 
Fernández, Rubén Costas, and Mario Cossio. Many of these 
prosecutions appear to be politically inspired. 
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Although the Morales administration does not represent the 
indigenous movement per se, Morales is the most prominent 
indigenous leader in Bolivia and most of the indigenous 
movement has supported and even facilitated his actions.  
Bolivian indigenous organizations, for example, participated 
in protests designed to intimidate opposition. Thus, the 
indigenous movement in Bolivia should be held partly 
responsible for the violations of democratic principles that 
have occurred under the Morales administration. 
 
The rise of indigenous movements in Latin America has also 
helped deepen democracy in some ways, however. First, the 
indigenous movements have helped the indigenous 
population gain greater political representation. Indigenous 
people traditionally had very little political influence in Latin 
America. The major political parties in the region typically 
did not recruit indigenous leaders as candidates for important 
elected offices, nor did they often name indigenous people to 
important positions within the government or the party 
hierarchy. As a result, very few indigenous people served in 
positions of authority in the Andean nations prior to the 
1990s. The rise of indigenous movements and, especially, 
indigenous parties changed all that. The indigenous parties 
have helped numerous indigenous people get elected as 
councilors, mayors, legislators, governors, and even 
president, in the case of Bolivia. Bolivia‟s new constitution 
also sets aside seats in the legislature and on the electoral 
tribunals for people of indigenous-peasant origin. In 
addition, indigenous people have been appointed to 
important ministerial positions in recent years. In Ecuador, 
for example, President Gutiérrez named indigenous people to 
the top positions in four ministries, including the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Indigenous people have also held a number of important 
ministries in Bolivia in recent years, including the Ministry 
of Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Justice. Indigenous 
people have made fewer inroads in Chile and Peru in large 
part because these countries have no major indigenous 
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parties and their indigenous movements are considerably 
weaker than in Bolivia and Ecuador. Nevertheless, the 
number of judges, prosecutors, mayors and legislators with 
indigenous last names has risen steadily in Peru in recent 
years, although they still represent a small proportion of the 
total (Paredes 2008, 12-3). Thus, the indigenous movement 
has helped deepen democracy in Latin America by 
promoting greater descriptive representation and political 
inclusion. 
 
The rise of indigenous movements has also helped increase 
political participation among indigenous people in the 
region. Voter turnout was traditionally lower in indigenous 
areas than in non-indigenous areas of the Andes in part 
because indigenous people had higher illiteracy rates, often 
lacked identity documents, and lived in more isolated areas. 
The failure of the main parties to recruit indigenous 
candidates or address indigenous demands may also have 
suppressed voter turnout in indigenous areas. The emergence 
of powerful indigenous parties and movements helped 
change this situation in Bolivia and Ecuador, however. The 
indigenous parties generated more enthusiasm for voting by 
running indigenous candidates and embracing traditional 
indigenous demands. They also pushed for the provision of 
free identity cards, the translation of electoral materials into 
indigenous languages, and the establishment of more voting 
centers in rural, highly indigenous areas. As a result, the 
turnout rate is now typically higher in indigenous areas than 
in non-indigenous areas of Bolivia and Ecuador (Madrid 
2005).  
 
In Bolivia, the rise of the indigenous movement and, 
specifically, the election of Evo Morales as president have 
also helped boost satisfaction with democracy among 
indigenous people (Madrid 2010). Before 2005, Bolivia had 
one of the lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy in the 
hemisphere and democratic satisfaction was particularly low 
among indigenous people.  After the election of Evo 
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Morales, however, satisfaction with democracy in Bolivia 
began to increase. Surveys by the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP) found that in 2008 65 percent of 
self-identified indigenous people reported being satisfied or 
very satisfied with democracy, up from 49 percent in 2004.
1
 
By contrast, only 48 percent of whites and mestizos reported 
being satisfied or very satisfied with democracy in 2008, 
which was slightly lower than in 2004. The percentage of 
indigenous Bolivians who believe that their country is 
democratic also rose considerably in the wake of Morales‟ 
election. According to LAPOP surveys, 66 percent of self-
identified indigenous people classified Bolivia as somewhat 
or very democratic in 2008, up from 51 percent in 2004. By 
contrast, only 60 percent of mestizos and whites categorized 
Bolivia as somewhat or very democratic in 2008, the same 
percentage as in 2004. Mass level evaluations of and 
satisfaction with democracy have also increased in Ecuador 
in recent years, but the timing of it appears unrelated to the 
rise of indigenous movement in that country. Moreover, the 
increase has not been higher among indigenous people than 
among whites and mestizos in Ecuador. 
 
Finally, the rise of the indigenous movements in the Andes 
has also helped deepen democracy in the Andes by reducing 
ethnic discrimination and inequality. The indigenous 
population has traditionally suffered from a great deal of 
social discrimination, and it lags behind the non-indigenous 
population on many socio-economic indicators including 
income, life expectancy, education, and access to health care 
and housing. Indigenous movements have lobbied hard for 
the government to implement policies to combat 
discrimination and to close these gaps. They have had the 
most success to date in Bolivia where the Morales 
administration has moved aggressively to address indigenous 
                                                 
1
 These data represent the author‟s original analyses of LAPOP survey 
data. For more information on LAPOP surveys, see: 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/  
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poverty and exclusion. Under Morales, the Bolivian 
government has tightened laws against racial discrimination 
and it has sought to enhance respect for indigenous culture 
through the teaching of indigenous languages and history in 
the public school system. Bolivia‟s new constitution also 
grants various collective rights to the indigenous population, 
including the right to self-governance and territorial 
autonomy and the right to use traditional forms of justice. In 
addition, the Morales administration has enacted laws that 
should disproportionately benefit the indigenous population, 
including literacy programs, a major agrarian reform 
program, and conditional cash transfer schemes. These 
measures appear to have brought some benefits already, 
since illiteracy, infant mortality, and extreme poverty have 
all declined under the Morales administration and the rural 
poor‟s share of national income has increased (Movimiento 
al Socialismo 2009).  
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This paper has argued that the rise of indigenous movements 
in Latin America has not had the negative effects that many 
policymakers and observers expected. The indigenous 
movement has opposed some U.S. initiatives in Latin 
America, but this opposition has been grounded in valid 
concerns and U.S. (and Latin American) policymakers 
should take these concerns into account in crafting policies 
toward the region. To begin with, policymakers should take 
steps to see that the indigenous population benefits from 
market-oriented policies, rather than being hurt by them. 
Latin American governments with the assistance of the 
United States should create social programs designed 
specifically to help the indigenous population compete in the 
market economy and to compensate for cuts in social 
spending that have negatively affected indigenous 
communities. Such programs could provide training and 
credit to indigenous farmers and entrepreneurs as well as 
seek to improve local health and education systems.  They 
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might be funded in part by tax revenue generated from the 
mining, forestry, and agricultural activities of corporations in 
indigenous areas. Efforts should also be made to ensure that 
these companies clean up the environmental damage caused 
by their activities and minimize such damage in the future. 
Latin American governments would need to be the instigator 
of such policies but the U.S. can play an important role in 
encouraging and supporting their implementation. 
 
The U.S. should also reorient its counternarcotics policy in 
several ways. First, the U.S. must acknowledge that there are 
legitimate, traditional uses of coca and it should work with 
Andean governments to limit coca farming to the amounts 
necessary to supply those traditional uses. Second, the U.S. 
policy should shift its focus away from eradication, which is 
a politically controversial policy that has created a great deal 
of anti-American sentiment without affecting the overall 
supply of coca grown in the region. Instead, it should devote 
more resources to encouraging peasant farmers to grow 
alternative crops. Third, the U.S. needs to do more to reduce 
the market for illegal drugs, such as cocaine, in the United 
States. As some indigenous leaders have pointed out, the 
U.S. has focused too much on eradicating the supply of 
drugs and not enough on developing policies, such as drug 
treatment programs, to stem the demand for drugs at home. 
 
More generally, the U.S. should try to engage indigenous 
movements in Latin America, rather than marginalize them. 
It should dialogue frequently with indigenous leaders and 
bring more of them to the United States for meetings and 
conferences. It should also develop programs so that the next 
generation of indigenous leaders might study in the United 
States or at least gain greater familiarity with this country. 
The U.S. should also support the indigenous movement‟s 
efforts to address inequality and discrimination and to 
promote indigenous political participation and 
representation. At the same time, however, the United States 
needs to continue to take a stand against policies or actions 
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by indigenous leaders that weaken democracy or exacerbate 
ethnic or political polarization. U.S. criticisms of the 
excesses of indigenous movements will only be effective, 
however, to the extent that the U.S. improves its ties to the 
indigenous movements and demonstrates that it can be a 
partner in the struggle against ethnic inequality in Latin 
America. 
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